

**Army's 2014 Aviation Restructuring Initiative Violates the
Joint Force Visions and the Total Force Doctrine**

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BIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Boyd. LTC Boyd is currently serving in the Missouri National Guard as the Staff Judge Advocate for 70th Troop Command, Jefferson Barracks, Missouri that is also the headquarters for the Region 7 Homeland Response Force. He graduated from Missouri State University receiving his Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology and minor in General Business in 1987. He graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law in 1990 earning his Juris Doctorate Degree.

LTC Boyd was commissioned through the Missouri National Guard in 2000 as a Judge Advocate. Prior to this current assignment, LTC Boyd served in Afghanistan under the 10th Mountain Combat Aviation Brigade with the 1-135th Aviation Reconnaissance Battalion from Missouri. LTC Boyd recently was deployed on State Active Duty to St. Louis, Missouri during Show Me Protection I and II (Ferguson, MO) in 2014.

LTC Boyd's serves as the elected Prosecuting Attorney for Scott County, Missouri with a population of approximately 39,000 citizens. He has been serving in that capacity since 2003. LTC Boyd has served as a District Public Defender (1991-1993), Assistant Attorney General (1994-1996), and a Special Assistant United States Attorney (1997-2001) for the State of Missouri.

INTRODUCTION

The 2014 Army Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) requires the National Guard to transfer all 192 Apache helicopters (AH-64) currently assigned to 8 National Guard Aviation Reconnaissance Battalions (ARBs) to the Army. In exchange, the Army will give the National Guard 111 Blackhawk helicopters (UH-60). As a joint plan, the ARI is flawed at best. The ARI will not meet the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) Joint Visions or the 18th Strategic Direction because following this plan will deny the existence of a joint force, will violate Abram's total force doctrine, and will fail the strategic intent of a Joint Force that balances our "response, rotation, and reset activities" of Army Aviation for the future.¹

The National Guard ARBs provide a dedicated, ready reserve with the capability to defend this nation efficiently in any crisis. The existence of the National Guard ARBs forms a total force that provides a joint force multiplier at home or abroad. The Armed Forces of the United States will continue to possess an overall force projection platform for domestic and foreign operations by maintaining, integrating and fostering the vast experience found in the men and women serving in the National Guard ARBs. All the joint force benefits to our National Security provided by the Guard ARBs will be lost forever by implementing the 2014 ARI.

Currently, there is a National Commission set to conduct hearings on the future of Army in response to firm opposition from many military and civilian leaders to the 2014 ARI. A Senate committee conducted a hearing on the ARI in 2014. The Senate committee believed "the Army has not considered the full fiscal implications of the proposal, and the Army has not provided the Committee a comprehensive divestiture

plan for the retiring helicopters.”² The National Commission’s final report is due no later than February 1, 2016.³

CJCS 2010 VISION

The CJCS 2010 Vision for joint operations published in 1996⁴ about eleven years after the Committee on Armed Services called for the reorganization of the United States Armed Forces with more joint force emphasis.⁵ The Committee found sixteen problems with the way the JCS and the Armed Services were failing to act and plan properly across the board with no real action toward the “integration of the services”.⁶

The 2010 Vision foresaw the 21st Century Force developing four operational concepts for success pursuing integration of the services.⁷ The concepts were dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. “To achieve this integration while conducting military operations, we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.”⁸ The most fundamental source of strength for the vision is “our people” according to the CJCS Shalikasvilli.⁹ The 2010 Vision states, “People are the Armed Forces; at the end of the day, our success in war or peace, will rest ultimately on the men and women of the Armed Forces.”¹⁰

The Armed Forces in 1996 were smaller than they had been in 40 years being faced with flat budgets and increased readiness costs.¹¹ The CJCS acknowledged that the imperative of jointness requires the Armed Forces to be “more efficient in protecting lives and resources” while accomplishing the mission.¹² The CJCS emphasized jointness that reduced redundancy between the services while building on every ounce

of capability from every source.¹³ The CJCS acknowledged jointness alone was not enough as the Armed Forces must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners as future operations will be more multinational.¹⁴ In this multinational vein, the National Guard already has in place partnership programs between countries used to develop ties, integrate actions and promote democracy abroad through the State Partnership Program (SPP).¹⁵

The CJCS noted that the judgment, creativity, and the fortitude of our people would remain the key to success in future joint operations.¹⁶ The 2010 Joint Vision required that the priority in meeting this vision was “recruiting and retaining dedicated high-quality people.”¹⁷ The 2010 Vision also noted that the organizations must become more responsive with less startup time between deployment and employment looking for reserve components that can rapidly integrate into joint organizations”.¹⁸

CJCS 2020 VISION

In 2000, the CJCS provided the 2020 Vision to foster the 2010 Vision further into the future. The CJCS 2020 Vision overarching goal was achievement of “full spectrum dominance” (FSD) meaning the Armed Forces would be “persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict”.¹⁹ The 2020 vision extends the template for building the joint force because “jointness” will bring flexibility and responsiveness that is the main key to success in the future.²⁰ The 2020 vision requires integration of the core competencies provided by the individual services including the active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian members rounding out the total force.²¹ A most effective force is “fully joint” meaning intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.²²

The Joint Force of the Future will gain full spectrum dominance when the United States alone or with our allies are able to conduct “prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with the combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains whether they be land, sea, air, space and information”.²³ The CJCS set out that the transformation of the joint force to reach full spectrum dominance will rely on our capacity for innovation. An effective innovation process requires continuous learning where the interactions and exchanges between the services during exercises, training, and real-world operations will allow them to discover the best practices for joint force success in the future.²⁴ Innovation allows the services involved to consider new weapons platforms, new processes, combinations of the old platforms with new platforms, or recombination of older platforms taking on new processes.²⁵ The 2020 vision requires the Armed Forces to create the best opportunities for coping with the increasing pace of change at home and abroad with new technologies and tactics used by our adversaries who have a vote as to our full spectrum dominance.²⁶

Visions and the Abrams Doctrine

The Apache is the premier aviation asset for Army offensive or defensive operations. The ARI’s elimination of the Apaches means the National Guard will be unable to meet fully the objectives of the CJCS visions for jointness as an organization where the existence of similar equipment between the active and the Guard equals integration “institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically” with the active component.²⁷ The seizure of the Apaches results in the National Guard not being truly interoperable with the Army, our sister services or allies as we are today. The Army’s

elimination of the Apaches weakens the National Guard ability to protect life and resources directed by the Joint Visions.²⁸

According to the Abrams Doctrine circa 1970²⁹, the National Guard and the Army Reserve are supposed to be ready reserve (partners) with the active Army as part of a total force that is a mirror image of the active component, receives similar first to fight funding, and cascading modernization of equipment.³⁰ Under the Abram's doctrine, mirror imaging calls for the National Guard to have some of the same kinds of combat units to be a more equal and relevant partner with a similar force structure.³¹ The "first to fight funding" requires that units in the reserve likely to see combat should be adequately funded keeping them "armed, well trained and manned."³² The cascading modernization element requires the reserves have modern equipment for the fight and not be handed worn out or outdated equipment making them less capable than the active force.³³ The total force concept has worked in the last few years because the Army treated the National Guard equally under the total force concept where they had not done so prior to 2001 as there was a need to expand our military capacity for two wars.³⁴ Now that the wars are over, so to speak, the Army is regressing to past practices of resource and equipment grabbing with leaders misusing concepts such as "total force" to justify the grab.³⁵

The proper application of the General Creighton Abrams "total force" doctrine encourages civilian and military leaders to make and retain a "clear linkage between the employment of the Army and the engagement of public support for military operations."³⁶ The doctrine calls for a sufficient force structure to accomplish defense missions, encourages an investment by the citizens in military campaigns, and may act

as an “extra-constitutional tripwire on the presidential use of military power”.³⁷ It is proposed that a “total force” structure would cause a president to consider if military action is necessary if s/he has to call on the reserves.”³⁸ The ARI’s seizure of the Apaches, mothballing numerous experienced Apache pilots and maintainers, and totally ignoring the “total force” doctrine that brought us to the end of two wars breaks any meaningful link with real public support for the Army.

Further, the ARI is an outright violation of the Abrams Doctrine that sets out what defines a total force, so we don’t repeat past military leadership errors. If the ARI is followed leaving the National Guard without Apaches, the Army, and the Department of Defense, have failed to plan properly for future joint force and success as a total force by disregarding the proper application of the Abram’s doctrine. The Abrams Doctrine violation was heightened when the Army and Boeing announced the \$500 million dollar purchase of 64 additional Apaches helicopters in fiscal years 2017 to 2021 involving some sales to US allies.³⁹ With this announcement and 2017 not being that far away, why throw the National Guard experience and investment out with the bathwater especially when “the most-experienced Apache pilots and maintainers are in the Army Guard?”⁴⁰ This fact will be something the National Commission will learn about the reality of Apache pilots in the National Guard.⁴¹ Thus, there is no good reason to follow the ARI when neither the Abrams doctrine nor the joint force vision is supported within the plan.

Joint Force Cost and Humanitarian Assistance

The Joint Visions set out that the Services are to be “more efficient in protecting lives and resources while accomplishing the mission” which is a total force

consideration and a mandatory joint force concept of integration with the government entities and private organizations.⁴² The mission can be a humanitarian mission here or abroad.

The National Guard is the first to be called out for humanitarian assistance (HA) or peacekeeping mission at home because the Guard can deploy as either a State or Federal resource.⁴³ The National Response Framework for disaster response requires that the lowest level response should address the crisis starting with a city, county, state up to a federal authority.⁴⁴ The National Guard is called to state active duty right after the local city or county indicates it can't adequately address the crisis. Generally, the active and the active reserves personnel are not deployed because they can't conduct law enforcement missions on US soil because it will violate the *Posse Comitatus Act* that separates police powers from the armed forces of the United States.⁴⁵ As a militia, the Guard can conduct law enforcement missions on request of the Governor.

If the peacekeeping mission is abroad, various service units might be called to Title 10 orders, including the National Guard. In any contingency operation, the United States currently has a ready reserve in the National Guard that can be maintained at about 42% of the active costs and readily fielded in a similar time frame as other standing Army but "reserved" active forces.⁴⁶

If one is looking for savings of money in a budget and efficiency in protecting lives and property, the money is better spent in the National Guard.⁴⁷ In the time of peace, the National Guard will be called upon more than the active components meeting homeland security operations under the National Response Framework. If something gets so big that the active components have to be called out to assist, the

National Guard will be there too because of distance to the event, current interoperability with the active components, and the reduced costs to deploy National Guard units. This last statement will hold unless 1) the Federal Government does not want the National Guard to be able to respond and/or 2) the National Guard is not made to mirror the active component thus making it incapable of responding to a threat from inside or outside our borders in violation of the total force doctrine.⁴⁸

Further, as much as the Army and the Army National Guard are the same, one has to acknowledge that the National Guard is also more robust in the roles they can play in defense of the nation as a joint force multiplier. A National Guardsman can be called to act under State Active Duty, as Title 32 forces on the order of the Governor, and as Title 10 forces on the order of the President. Active duty deploys pursuant to Title 10 authorizations only. Thus, the National Guard is most likely the branch of the Army first to the fight for the defense of the homeland. In fact, General Odierno acknowledged National Guardsman were the first military force in the air and on the ground after the attack at the World Trade Center in September 2001.⁴⁹

BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 AND THE ARI

Neither the 2010 Vision nor the 2020 Vision both published prior to 2001 envisioned the harsh reality of the 2011 Budget Control Act.⁵⁰ In 2011, the Budget Control Act (BCA) was passed to address the US debt issues that, if not addressed by a budget cut, would affect the full faith and credit standing of the country at the international level.⁵¹ The BCA called for mandatory cuts in spending across the board (sequester) if Congress failed to act on a budget by January of each year.⁵² Congress

failed to act, and sequester hit in January of 2013, forcing government shutdown and furloughs for many employees of the Department of Defense.

The Army's initial plan for addressing budget cuts under the BCA called for Army aviation to lose five (5) Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs).⁵³ In 2014, the Army counter-proposed the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) calling for the Army to lose three (3) CABs and take all 192 of the Apache helicopters from the National Guard replacing them with 111 Black Hawk Helicopters while maintaining a total of 690 Apaches.⁵⁴ It should be noted that no alternative plan from a National Guard source nor the Governors of the States to be affected by the ARI were incorporated, much less requested, into the proposed ARI or the Army's follow on budget of 2015. To date, Army leadership is pushing the ARI ahead despite the plan not having formal approval of Congress.⁵⁵

In the aviation arena, trading Apaches for Blackhawks is similar to the laymen trading corvettes for station wagons. In the combat arena, trading Apaches for Blackhawks is trading combat for non-combat aircraft. Apaches are designed for aerial engagement of enemy targets and reconnaissance missions looking for people, targets of opportunity or movement of enemy forces or assets. Apaches are designed to carry only two pilots. Blackhawks are troop transport helicopters with limited enemy engagement capabilities having a crew of 4 and carrying up to 8 passengers. Many Blackhawks are used specifically for medical evacuation of wounded from a battlefield or disaster area. Therefore, the National Guard will lose interoperability as a joint force with the active Army by not mirroring the same capabilities as the active component in violation of the Abrams Doctrine. Thus, repeating the same force projection mistakes

our leaders made before Korea and Vietnam when the United States found the reserve forces inadequately equipped and trained for war.

For reference, two alternative aviation restructure plans have been offered for consideration. One by Pennsylvania Army National Guard and the second by the National Guard Bureau. The Pennsylvania plan proposes the guard have five Combat Aviation Brigades, two Aviation Brigades, and two Theater Aviation Commands.⁵⁶ The PA plan was designed with input from the Army War College to restructure the Guard's current eight ARBs.⁵⁷ A second plan by the National Guard Bureau plan called for the National Guard to provide an additional "20% increase in capability for a modest increase in cost."⁵⁸ The Guard plan called for eighteen Apache Battalions in the active component with two Apache Battalions in the Guard and four more guard battalions that would be a multi-component mix of helicopters.⁵⁹

ARI FAILS TO ADDRESS COST TO THE NATIONAL GUARD

The leadership at the Army Aviation Center of Excellence indicated they went through thousands of models to arrive at the ARI.⁶⁰ The ARI discusses savings to the Army budget (resources) but there appears to be no consideration of the loss to the States as to their budgets, personnel or infrastructure with the loss of the local ARBs as discussed above.⁶¹ Specifically, the ARI does not account for the financial impact to personnel supplied by the National Guard and their respective states.⁶² Each state has to field, train or maintain Soldiers to do the necessary tasks to keep the battalions ready. The States have expended time, money and resources to provide necessary infrastructures and buildings to house the units. If the Guard ARBs are literally decommissioned, the result will be loss of personnel with experience, loss of jobs in the

community, required costs for necessary retraining of personnel left serving, and a force that is less prepared to meet homeland defense missions and provide combat power as part of a joint force.⁶³ In 2014, the Senate sent the Army back to prove that the ARI considered the full fiscal implications of the plan for the total force/total army.⁶⁴ The Senate wrote:

Army Aviation Restructure Initiative [ARI] - The Army's fiscal year 2015 budget request proposes a significant restructuring of Army aviation assets. This includes transferring all Apache helicopters to the active Army from the Army National Guard and shifting Blackhawk helicopters from the active Army to the Army National Guard. The proposal also includes retiring the Kiowa Warrior helicopters and replacing the TH-67 trainer helicopters with Lakota helicopters. The Committee believes the Army has not considered the full fiscal implications of the proposal, and the Army has not provided the Committee a comprehensive divestiture plan for the retiring helicopters.

The National Guard has eight ARBs of support personnel, pilots and mechanics that have twenty or more years of professional experience and personal investment in the ARBs.⁶⁵ Professional experience means that many of the pilots are Apache trained and also fly other aircraft through their civilian jobs. This extra flight experience adds to the overall “highly trained” professional Soldier the CJCS wants to encourage and retain for the joint force.⁶⁶ The civilian job experience also allows Soldiers to bring additional professional assets, creativity and innovative practices to the table for joint operations that aren’t duplicated in the active component.⁶⁷ This experience plays well when working with our civilian or international counterparts in the joint environment.⁶⁸

Professional experience also applies to the majority of the mechanic or maintenance Soldiers who work on the Apaches every day as full-time Guardsmen or state technicians.⁶⁹ In most states, almost one-quarter of the force is full-time national guardsman.⁷⁰ Some Guardsman have served their whole career on the Apaches.⁷¹ If

the ARI is followed and, as noted, “irreversible” by the Army,⁷² the loss of experience for the force will be squandered when at times over 50 percent of the deployed forces after 2001 were made up of Guardsman.⁷³ Congress following the ARI will result in the Army “losing strategic depth and the ability to have a combat-ready reserve” for the joint force.⁷⁴

A second concern regarding professional experience not addressed by making the irreversible seizure of Apache aircraft is the loss of training and personnel when Apache pilots leave the active service.⁷⁵ Flight school training of an Apache pilot costs about one million dollars each. For attending flight school, an Apache pilot has to give six more years of active service after going through flight school before they can leave active duty. In six years, the pilot’s family will move two times as most assignments are three years in time. Many families just don’t adapt to the gypsy life of an active duty family. So, where can that Soldier go with that investment in training on the Apache if she or he still wants to serve the country? Presently, it would be the National Guard in one of the eight battalions. Under the ARI proposed seizure, the Soldier will have no units to join outside the active component. The investment in that Soldier as an Apache pilot will be lost.

Personal investment means that the guardsmen have sacrificed time away from their families to maintain their proficiency as pilots and maintain the proper physical conditioning required of Soldiers. Unlike the active pilots who can exercise and fly during the hours of their “job”, the Guard pilots have to take additional time away from the family to keep up their flight hours because there is not enough time during drill weekends to maintain flight hours each month for all the pilots on ground. The pilots do

this every month just to serve. The dedication to service by the National Guard Apache pilots meets the desire of the CJCS, who wants dedicated professionals in the joint force as he indicated that people are the greatest resource for success.⁷⁶

NATIONAL GUARD BRINGS INNOVATION AND INTEROPERABILITY

An objective of the CJCS Joint Vision 2010 is to foster a climate within the services of developing the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners as future operations will be more multinational.⁷⁷ The National Guard does this on two fronts. First, the National Guard has the SPP, as mentioned earlier. Second, some of the National Guard ARBs are currently joint based and have conducted joint training to promote interoperability with sister services.

The SPP, conducted by the National Guard, promotes jointness with our allies that has no equal in the armed services. Through SPP, the National Guard conducts military-to-military engagements in support of defense security goals but also leverages whole-of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres.”⁷⁸ For the last twenty years, the National Guard has conducted a State Partnership Program with various countries around the world.⁷⁹ Some of the countries sponsored in the SPP are Ukraine, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Nigeria, Jordan, Morocco, Azerbaijan, and Liberia.⁸⁰ This program allows “innovative, low-cost, small footprint security cooperation tools” available to the Department of Defense in accordance with the combatant commanders’ missions and guided by the State Department’s foreign policy goals.⁸¹ The SPP contains all eight of the states with ARBs. The eight ARBs and their sponsor

countries are Arizona (Kazakhstan), Idaho (Cambodia), Utah (Morocco), South Carolina (Columbia), North Carolina (Botswana), Missouri (Panama), Pennsylvania (Lithuania), and Texas (Chile).⁸² In 2013, the SPP program completed 739 security cooperation events across all six Geographic Combatant Commands, ensuring the goals and objectives of those commanders were met in their area of operation.⁸³

The SPP enhances the ability of the United States to develop and integrate with multinational operations whenever it might be necessary to deploy for a humanitarian assistance mission, a peacekeeping mission, or a campaign. The integration with those countries also enables the prospect of access through or using those countries' assets as part of a regional coalition confronting a threat to national security. The Apache battalions within that National Guard framework provide a total force that enhances joint functions within that country or the regional coalition given the previous investment by the respective state. With Boeing's 2015 announcement of projected sales of Apache helicopters to some of our allies, the retention of the ARBs in the respective states will be a force multiplier in future joint operations and joint training exercises with those allies receiving Apaches. Major General Frederick S. Rudesheim, US Army South Commander, when referring to the SPP stated, "[t]he value here is almost incalculable. What you have here is not episodic, but long term."⁸⁴ Further, General Carter Ham, former U.S. Africa Command Commander stated, "The real benefit of the State Partnership Program is the enduring relationship, that sergeants and lieutenants and captains grow up together and have multiple engagements. You probably have the co-chairs of the State Partnership Program fan club seated here."⁸⁵ The people General

Carter was referring to were himself and US Navy Admiral James Stavridis as the co-chairs.

JOINT FORCE INTEROPERABILITY

As examples of working on joint force interoperability, the 1-151 ARB from South Carolina has set the bar high for any ARB whether active or guard. The 1-151 ARB out of South Carolina conducted over ten, multi-day joint training exercises with Navy, Air Force, Army, Marine, and the Peoples Republic of Korea land, air and sea units from November 2012 to November 2014.⁸⁶ The training missions included joint live-fire exercises, deck landing, reconnaissance operations, overwater operations, close air support, and air insertion exercises.⁸⁷

The 1-151 ARB demonstrates the CJCS Vision where units seek opportunities to develop professional experience fostering joint interoperability. The training was done all within the United States without loss of personnel or aircraft.⁸⁸ The South Carolina ARB has demonstrated over the last three years that reserve components can rapidly integrate into joint operations with sister services. Further, the 1-151 ARB joint training history demonstrates that National Guard ARBs can muster and meet the training requirements to be ready to mobilize within 30 days.⁸⁹

18th Strategic Direction of the Joint Force

General Martin E. Dempsey recently published the 18th Chairman's 2nd term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force in 2012.⁹⁰ GEN Dempsey stated "...the Joint Force deters adversaries, protects our critical infrastructure, preserves the free flow of commerce, responds to crisis, and builds partner capacities."⁹¹ He notes that the

enduring power of the Joint Force comes from our leaders balancing our response, rotation and reset activities in support of a sustainable national strategy.⁹² Our military leaders must make a balanced plan that will support our nation's objectives, allowing for proper responses to the crisis, rotation of armed forces through enduring campaigns, and planning reset activities that will recharge and train those who may have to go forward again. This is where the National Guard plays the role of providing support to lengthy campaigns where the active component can rotate out and reset because the Guard is ready to take up the mission.

If the ARI is allowed to be implemented, the ability of the National Guard to fulfill the "total force" role as to the Apaches will be nonexistent. Secondly, if "joint force" is taken to the proper level, the National Guard should be able to go with a sister service as if they were an organic unit. Currently, National Guardsmen have proven that they can step in and provide the necessary support to Marines, Navy Seals or Special Forces operations.

GEN Dempsey notes in the Strategic Direction for the Joint Force that we should deepen our military-to-military ties and develop relationships with our interagency and international partners.⁹³ Why? He acknowledges that we will have a smaller force because of a different force posture, a smaller defense budget, and movement of some active duty soldiers to civilian life.⁹⁴ Thus, we will need to rely on our coalition partners in future crisis actions. If employed properly under the total force doctrine, the National Guard is a cornerstone of the joint force foundation for national strategy when budgets are shrinking. In this case, for two reasons.

First, the National Guard is decades ahead with the SPP in developing these ties. As indicated above, the probable sales of Apache aircraft to our allies should make Apache pilots within the Guard a valuable consideration for training, conducting exercises and deploying for actual military operations with the sponsored nation. The presence of the Guard pilots will allow for joint interoperability to develop ahead of any possible crisis. Apaches in the Guard will aid in driving jointness forward internationally.

Second, as the Army shrinks as it should in “times of peace”, those leaving the Army may still serve and be combat ready for service in the National Guard. Apache pilots and mechanics who are asked to leave or decide to leave active service may still find a home if there are Apache units in the National Guard. The US people will be secure knowing that the investment in the pilots and the mechanics will not be lost or cost more to retrain. The availability of a second home for active Apache personnel is a means to allocate resources in support of a “systematic and sustainable strategy” under the Strategic Direction.⁹⁵

Finally, GEN Dempsey states that we have a duty to keep the faith with our military personnel, families and the Nation.⁹⁶ He proposes that we do this in support of the joint force by being honest and upfront about changes that will affect them and their families personally.⁹⁷ He also states that the Armed Forces has a duty to listen “as our fellow citizens may have a different perspective that we [Armed Forces] need to hear and understand”⁹⁸ as the public’s interest and support may wane toward the Joint Force of the future. *The ARI is an example of the Army not listening to the people or being truly honest in assessments of capabilities.* Where 36% of the United States Army is manned by the National Guard found in our 50 states, it is the Council of Governors who wants

to be heard on the joint force of the future as well as the Soldiers and their families.⁹⁹

The National Commission must balance the defense needs of the country when those in charge are failing that endeavor so the errors of the past are not repeated.

CONCLUSION

The Joint Force of the future requires that the Army National Guard have mirrored units with the active Army to support the total force under Abrams Doctrine. A total force means one that is capable to integrate into a joint environment involving combat operations with the active Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard and Reserve units that will accurately support the CJCS Joint Visions .A total force is one that can conduct humanitarian or peace missions at home or abroad with the active services, our coalition partners, government entities and non-government organizations meeting the benchmark for the Strategic Direction. The National Guard ARBs provide the United States a ready reserve able to deploy when called upon by the Nation. In all respects, the ARI is counter to the joint vision, the total force concept set out in the Abrams Doctrine, and the strategic guidance previously given by GEN Dempsey. The National Commission on the Future of the Army should apply the principles set out herein to find a means to develop a true total force able to integrate into joint operations when called to defend this great nation at home or abroad.

¹Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 18th Chairman's 2nd Term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force". Washington DC, February 12, 2012. http://www.jcs.mil/portals/36/Documents/CJCS_2nd_Term_Strategic_Direction.pdf (accessed February 22, 2015)

²Senate Armed Services Committee, Summary of hearing transcript. April 8, 2014. http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/SASC%20Active%20Army%20and%20Reserve%20Force%20Mix%208APR14_0.pdf. (accessed February 26, 2015).

³ Leahy, Patrick Senator, "National Commission of the Future of the Army Act, Section by section". <http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Army%20Commission%20SbS.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2015).

⁴ Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington DC, 1996. <http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2015), "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions." John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

⁵ United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services*, United States Senate. Washington, DC: GPO 1985. The report found 16 problems with U.S. Military Establishment. Pages 3-11. The key concerns sparking the report were operational failures and deficiencies, poor inter-service coordination, acquisition process deficiencies, lack of strategic direction, and poor inter-service coordination.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Joint Vision 2010, 1.

⁸ Ibid. 9.

⁹ Ibid. 2.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid. 8.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid. 9.

¹⁵ National Guard Bureau, Division of International Affairs. "The National Guard State Partnership Program, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2013. January 2014.

<http://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/JointStaff/J5/InternationalAffairsDivision/StatePartnershipProgram.aspx> (accessed February 22, 2015). The National Guard has 68 partnerships with over 74 countries building military and business ties with them over the last 20 years. The Active Components do not have a similar program.

¹⁶ Joint Vision 2010, 27.

¹⁷ Ibid, 6. The ARI will call for the loss of National Guard Apache pilots who will not be able to leave civilian employment for training on a new military specialty. See, the testimony of General Frank Grass, Chief of National Guard Bureau, before Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2014. http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/SASC%20Active%20Army%20and%20Reserve%20Force%20Mix%208APR14_0.pdf.

¹⁸ Ibid, 31. The work that the National Guard does in the State Partnerships is indicative of promoting success via integrating into joint operations with our allies and coalition partners from humanitarian assistance, peace keeping mission all the way to full military campaigns.

¹⁹ Department of Defense. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 2020*. Washington DC, July 19, 2000. Pages 57-76. <http://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads/1225.pdf> (accessed January 29, 2015). Page 58. It should be noted that both the 2010 and 2020 vision were written published approximately four years apart. Both were written prior to OIF and OEF without any modified vision statement from the CJCS in the last fourteen (14) years.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 61.

²⁴ Ibid, 62.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid, 63.

²⁷ Joint Vision 2010, 9.

²⁸ Lowenberg, Timothy, MAJ GEN, National Guard Association of the United States, *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*, <http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/pdf/primer%20fin.pdf> (accessed February 26, 2015). MG

Lowenberg noted that the Army hasn't adhered to the Abrams Doctrine in either funding, providing new equipment or training the Army National Guard in an efficient and ready manner unlike the Air Force has done for the Air National Guard.

²⁹Hargett, Gus, "NGAUSA: Commission Must Rethink Who's Really Ready." *Breaking Defense*, January 19, 2015. <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/ngaus-commission-must-rethink-whos-really-ready/> (accessed February 22, 2015)

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⁴⁹Greenhill, Jim SFC, "Odierno: National Guard contributions since 9/11 'critical'". *Army.Mil*. September 11, 2012. <http://www.army.mil/article/87056/> (accessed February 26, 2012) (Odierno stated, "Our citizen-Soldiers were the first to respond").

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